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Abstract. The Covid-19 pandemic has only accelerated the need and desire to deal 
more openly with mortality, because the effect on survival is central to the 
comprehensive assessment of harms and benefits needed to meet a ‘reasonable 
patient’ legal standard. Taking the view that this requirement is best met through a 
multi-criterial decision support tool, we offer our preferred answers to the questions 
of What should be communicated about mortality in the tool, and How, given 
preferred answers to Who for, Who by, Why, When, and Where. Summary measures, 
including unrestricted Life Expectancy and Restricted Mean Survival Time are 
found to be reductionist and relative, and not as easy to understand and communicate 
as often asserted. Full lifetime absolute survival curves should be presented, even if 
they cannot be ‘evidence-based’ beyond trial follow-up limits, along with equivalent 
measures for other criteria in the (necessarily) multi-criterial decision. A decision 
support tool should relieve the reasonable person of the resulting calculation burden. 
Keywords: mortality, life expectancy, survival curves, Restricted Mean Survival 
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1. Background  
Our setting is the person making an individual health decision, often in conjunction with 
a healthcare professional, but often at home in the community (where one of their health 
decisions may be whether or not to contact a health professional). Our underlying 
motivation and aim is the development of a generic decision support template, to be the 
basis of decision support tools (DSTs) for specific health-related decisions. We take for 
granted that any health decision is multi-criterial, whether the objective is health 
promotion or disease prevention - often in the absence of a professional diagnosis - or 
therapeutic - often after a professional diagnosis. As eponymously indicated, the focus 
here is on the mortality criterion, a literally vital one, albeit always alongside other 
criteria such as those relating to morbidity and option burden. These DSTs must facilitate 
optimal individualisation and personalisation, in ways to be defined - and hence clearly 
distinguished.  
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This is a huge topic, so we use Kipling’s simple taxonomy of ‘What and Why and 
When, And How and Where and Who’ to move the discussion along. It will immediately 
be apparent, however, that the possible answers to all of these are interrelated, indeed in 
many cases seriously interdependent. Our prime concern is with What and How, as the 
main determinants of the structure and contents of the decision support template. When, 
Where, Who, and Why address the background contexts and conditions. Throughout, the 
proffered answers reflect our preferences. Others may, and almost certainly will, have 
different preferences - and answers - reflecting beliefs and interests different from ours. 
2. Who, When, Where  
Who for? is the best place to start, since we need to determine and distinguish the parties 
involved in decision-supporting communication about mortality, and Who splits 
naturally into ‘Who for?’ and ‘Who by?’. To us, the communication is for the reasonable 
person (RP) making a health decision. A subset of RP’s health decisions involve those 
taken within professional healthcare services, following a decision to engage with them. 
RP is assumed to require no support in recognising that a health decision is required and 
acknowledges the mortality implications of their health-related options must be 
considered. They will therefore positively request and/or expect this within any decision 
support.  
When is RP making a health decision? They are making a health decision whenever, 
after maximum possible individualisation, there is no option that has the best or equal 
best performance rates on all their decision criteria – ‘the things that matter to them’. If 
there is such a ‘dominant’ option, there is actually no decision to make and so no need 
for personalisation to make it preference-sensitive. Individualisation is the process of 
refining the option performance rates for a criterion on the basis of the individual’s 
characteristics. Personalisation is the process of adjusting the inputs to a decision on the 
basis of the individual person’s preferences, i.e. their value judgements. Our preference 
is for these to be expressed as their criterion importance weights. 
So, taking life expectancy (LE) as an example of a possible mortality criterion, in 
individualisation the estimated LE for an individual is progressively refined from an 
initially coarse (least individualised) one, based only on their sex and age, through 
adjustments in the light of other epidemiological characteristics (e.g. family history, 
ethnicity, location) and with reference to personally observable characteristics (e.g. 
weight, blood pressure), and, finally, to the most individualised one by adding those 
determinable mainly by healthcare professionals or services (biological markers, 
medication history). Personalisation may take two forms. In comparing the LE associated 
with two options, the importance attached to the extension offered by the superior option 
may not involve simple linear extrapolation: the importance of LE changes may be 
subjected to time preference, usually ‘discounting’. Secondly, LE is assigned importance 
weight relative to other criteria in the decision. The degree of personalisation will reflect 
the extent to which the elicitation and incorporation of criterion and time preferences are 
facilitated in (the) decision support. 
Who by? For us, the communication is by either a healthcare professional or a 
credible provider-independent source. This reflects our distinction between the RP-as-
person and RP-as-patient, i.e. as ‘reasonable patient’, legally speaking [1]. That 
distinction leads us directly into that between apomediative and intermediative decision 
support [2, 3] - and so to our preferred answers to Where. 
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Where? Intermediative decision support usually comes in the form of a Patient 
Decision Aid (PDA), designed to help the clinician and patient decide - in a clinic or 
teleconsultation - what is best for the patient. The options included in a PDA are typically 
restricted to those which the clinician feels relevant to the patient, and those they are able 
to prescribe or recommend within a guideline. The delivery of the aid within the 
encounter is under the clinician’s control. In contrast, an apomediative Decision Support 
Tool (DST) is a ‘direct-to-person-as-person’ resource designed to help the person decide 
what is best for themselves - at home or elsewhere in the community, and usually online. 
They are developed by a provider-independent team of professional health analysts, 
operating within consumer law and rights provisions rather than under health 
professional ‘duty of care’ commitments, legal and ethical. A clinician may become 
involved, subsequently, in adding their support to that provided by an apomediative DST 
that the person has consulted - and will add value to the extent that they have greater 
relevant knowledge and can enhance individualisation. However, the significance of 
their individualisation improvement will depend on personalisation - improving 
individualisation in relation to a lowly-weighted criterion may be of little importance. 
Finally, a clinician may actively promote ‘hybrid apo-intermediation’ by inviting 
patients to engage with an apomediative aid at home in advance of a clinic consultation. 
While this transforms the apomediative DST into a clinician-managed one, the resulting 
encounter will be different from pure intermediation, because of the different answers to 
What and How, and Why, to which we now turn. 
3. Why, What, How 
Why? The healthcare literature displays growing acceptance of the need to deal with 
mortality more directly, and openly, than has been traditional in clinical practice. The 
Covid-19 pandemic has only accelerated this process, because the effect on survival is 
central to the comprehensive assessment of option harms and benefits to which the 
person is legally entitled under a ‘reasonable patient’ standard. In the absence of an 
overriding reason, this standard makes clear that some communication about mortality is 
required, leading directly to the consequential questions of What and How regarding the 
contents of the ‘some’. At the other extreme, simple consumer demand, again absent 
some overriding reason, provides sufficient grounds for some communication about 
mortality, either on request as intermediative patient, or on search as apomediative 
person. The law trumps, as in the case of lack of demand, or outright refusal of 
communication about mortality by the patient, the acquiescing clinician may not obtain 
informed consent and be at legal risk.  [1] 
What constitutes an ‘overriding reason’ becomes crucial. It will almost always take 
the form of an ethical argument of a consequentialist or deontological sort, perhaps 
endorsed or even mandated by a professional code. How particular ethical reasons play 
out within the ‘reasonable patient’ standard is likely to remain legally moot in our view. 
However, we reject any attempted ethical justification for the suppression or distortion 
of the best available mortality estimates achievable through individualisation. These 
include ones intended to maintain ‘hope’ and ‘optimism’, since a requisite understanding 
of probability provides a firmer and superior ethical foundation for the warrantable hope 
and optimism that RP is entitled to maintain. RP is not devoid of emotions, moods and 
feelings, but accepts that the decision support offered (and requested) should be 
minimally distorted in content and delivery by temporary - entirely ‘natural’ and ‘human’ 
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- affective states. At the same time, they are aware and assured their basic feelings 
constitute the necessary and valid basis for preference-sensitive decisions, as achieved 
through personalisation.  
What? We assume RP requires decision support incorporating the best 
(individualised) numerical central point estimates for a mortality measure, accompanied 
by credible intervals. RP accepts that introducing verbal quantifications – high/low, 
long/short, big/small - will not add value and increase the possibility of bias, cognitive 
or motivational.  
Any mortality measure relates to a single option (alternative/strategy//intervention), 
and so, in the (genuine, undominated) decisional context, the preferred mortality measure 
is required for each of these options. This creates a key issue, unfortunately too often 
ignored or overlooked. Are the two (or more) option-specific mortality measures to be 
processed as a set, producing a mono-criterial comparative assessment of the relative 
mortality impact of the options (usually in the form of a difference)? Or are they to be 
kept in isolation from each other and processed separately, each in conjunction with the 
equivalent measures for the other criteria in the multi-criterial assessment that 
characterises most health decisions? The answer has serious implications for 
personalisation, as we now illustrate, in the course of introducing the most familiar 
example of one of the possible types of answer to What: Life Expectancy, a summary 
mortality measure on an unrestricted time scale. 
Assume that the LE for a 70 year old man without an intervention is 81, and that 
with the intervention it is 84. A widespread practice in making such a binary decision is 
to reduce the two LEs to a single summary measure of mortality impact, by taking their 
difference. The effect of the intervention is seen as a LE increase of 3 years, maybe 
phrased as 3 Life Years Gained by the intervention, or Lost by not having it. However, 
if the person attaches importance to other criteria, such as avoiding morbidity and option 
burden, they need to compare their personalized overall assessment of a non-dominant 
intervention e.g. ‘LE 84; morbidity 79; burden 65’, with that for the no intervention 
scenario ‘LE 81; morbidity 79; burden 75’. Premature reduction of absolute criterion 
values to their differences, rules out proper personalization through criterion importance 
weighting. 
This fundamental issue remains latent as we go more deeply into the possible 
answers offered to What, starting with the term ‘unrestricted’. Unrestricted means that 
the mortality measure is calculated over full lifetime, not for any limited or ‘restricted’ 
time horizon. LE is unrestricted in being calculated as the average length of life of all 
those in a cohort, including the years lived by those in the tail of its distribution, e.g. 
those surviving beyond 100. (Median LE is sometime used to reduce the effect of the 
more extreme outliers have on the Mean LE, but it is still an unrestricted measure.)  
While it may seem obvious that we require an unrestricted measure, some of the most 
used mortality measures are ‘Restricted’, including the increasingly popular Restricted 
Mean Survival Time (RMST) metric [4]. Its methodological home is in the wider ‘Time-
to-Event’ (TTE) literature, which embraces events less final than death, especially 
adverse ones such as heart attack, stroke, or fracture. Many recent papers make the case 
for TTE metrics as being equal to, if not better than, conventional measures, such as the 
Hazard Ratio (HR), Relative Risk (RR), or Number Needed to Treat (NNT), in capturing 
and communicating the evidence-based merits of options to clinicians and patients. Most 
who advocate TTE measures do so because, in line with those conventional measures, 
they present trial results in a statistically valid way, even when follow-up falls well short 
of lifetime, as it usually does. 
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In briefly documenting the case being made for TTE measures when the event is 
death, we see that How is being addressed along with What. As explained by Kloecker: 
“The RMST difference compares the areas under the 2 survival curves for the 
intervention and control groups for a specified (restricted) interval. This contrast 
corresponds to the mean temporal postponement of the outcome in one group compared 
with the other, with each group-specific RMST quantifying the average delay in the event 
over the specified time horizon… [Take as example a 70-year-old man.] On the basis of 
EMPA-REG OUTCOME [a trial with a 4 year follow-up], the Hazard Ratio for all-cause 
mortality is 0.68. The corresponding RMST difference is 21 days postponement over 4 
years. The health care professional could advise the patient that empagliflozin, on 
average, would prolong his life by 21 days over 4 years” [5] (pp 541, 545). 
There is internal debate as to whether RMST is best measured by the dominant 
‘vertical’ method of Kloecker and others [6] or by the alternative ‘horizontal’ method 
first deployed by Lytsy in relation to the 4S statin trial [7] and used recently by Bellavia 
[8]. However, we do not need to enter this debate since, measured either way, restricted 
follow-up means that in most cases only a limited number of patients have experienced 
the target event by study closure. In the horizontal measure TTE can be calculated only 
for those percentiles of the population that have experienced the event (death) - a 
percentage that will often fall far short of even the median survival length (50th 
percentile). So, in the Lytsy statin study, the delay of 1 year calculated for the seventh 
percentile by definition applies only to the 7% in the untreated group who we know died 
within the follow-up period of the study. But we also know, again by definition, that this 
delay does not apply to the 93% who did not die. 
Why use any restricted survival measure then? The answer reflects the preference 
for producing - and having guidelines and clinicians limited to using - ‘evidence-based’ 
mortality measures, where evidence is effectively restricted to that produced by the 
results of RCTs. Apart from the terminal situation, there is therefore only one possible 
exception: when the trial data permit ‘unrestricted’ conclusions. Claggett, et al. argue an 
‘actuarial’ approach sometimes makes this possible. Used by them in two conditions 
[9,10], and by Dorresteijn [11], the ‘delay of death’ is measured from the person’s age 
at diagnosis, not from time of diagnosis (irrespective of age). This method requires the 
underlying study/trial data to have “wide age range in the patient population, as well as 
a sufficiently large number of events occurring across the age spectrum in order to allow 
for relatively stable age-specific risk estimates… For any given age, a survival curve was 
estimated, representing the survival probabilities over time for patients alive at that age 
and receiving LCZ696 [the control]. A corresponding survival curve was then estimated 
using data from patients receiving enalapril [the intervention]. This process was repeated 
to produce estimated treatment effects for each age from 45-80 years 
old....[9](Supplementary Appendix, p2). The Utrecht group led by Dorresteijn applied 
this unrestricted lifetime TTE measurement to the results of the Women’s Health study 
in which nearly 28,000 initially healthy women were followed up for a mean of 10 years. 
Crucially, there were a substantial number of older participants, because “predictions of 
lifetime models are not limited by the follow-up time of the study but rather by the age 
distribution of study participants. Therefore, observations in elderly patients are essential 
for stable long term predictions” [11] (p1). 
So, an ‘evidence-based’ commitment means that the unrestricted lifetime mortality 
estimates to which RP is entitled can be provided only in the relatively rare cases meeting 
standard evidential requirements. However, we note that it is not only, or even primarily, 
the scientific standards for what constitutes ‘evidence’, that are the problem. Many of 
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the appropriate standards could be met, if it were not for the domination of short-term 
funding arrangements and commitments by the public and private supporters of research. 
For most researchers and groups, a circa 3-year ‘restricted mean survival time’ is the 
reality.  
No particular restricted TTE is meaningful to a RP. Short of their lifetime, each and 
every particular restricted time period could be meaningful to a particular RP. There is 
therefore no way in which one of these can be privileged just because it is the follow-up 
limit of relevant robust, ’evidence-generating’ research. RP is entitled to attach personal 
meaning to each and every extra year of life as represented in the full survival functions 
relevant to their decision. In practice and in life there is therefore no alternative to 
lifetime extrapolation beyond the restricted evidence. There are two possibilities. One is 
explicit extrapolation based on one of many possible principles, e.g. that the proportional 
hazard ratio calculated from the survival curves continues to apply. The other possibility 
is implicit, undiscussed, maybe unconscious, extrapolation. However, for the clinician, 
who, remember, is always engaging with RP, the latter is not a legally secure choice. 
They will need to supply, and document, their best explicit extrapolation, based on all 
their resources.  
Despite emphasising its virtues, most advocates of RMST agree there is a serious 
issue with its simple use as an answer to What, because: 
“… estimates of RMST differences depend on, and should be interpreted with 
reference to, the event rate in both groups and the duration of follow-up or, rather, the 
specified time horizon… Because the RMST difference reflects the difference in the 
areas under 2 survival curves, the same difference may be obtained from diverse 
combinations of survival curves. For example, an RMST difference of 1 year over 5 
years may be the result of an RMST of either 4 years in the treatment group and 3 years 
in the control group or 3 years in the treatment group and 2 years in the control group. 
As with the aforementioned measures of absolute risk reduction, we therefore advise 
interpretation of the RMST along with the survival curves” [5] (p548). 
This is too weak. The much stronger version, and our preferred answer to What, 
takes us immediately to the two (Kaplan-Meier) survival curves, from which all 
restricted or unrestricted single summary measures, such as RMST and LE, are derived. 
Referring to the underlying survival curves (restricted or unrestricted) cannot be merely 
an ideal, or something that could lead to ‘better appreciation’ [12] (p58). All single 
summary mortality measures are completely dependent on the two generative survival 
curves, and the absolute probabilities (KM estimators), that compose those curves, are 
essential to give personal meaning to the difference between them. Any single number 
mortality metric such as the RMST difference is reductionist as well as relative; it 
removes the two absolute groundings required in a multi-criterial health decision - which 
means all health decisions involving benefits and harms. The plotting of survival 
probabilities and curves on a truncated scale, common in the TTE literature (e.g. from 
0.95 to 1 in Kloecker), exacerbates this problem.  
Let us imagine how Reasonable Person might respond to the RMST TTE measure, 
having had it explained in the context of the Lytsy statin study: 
‘So if - but only if - I were to die 6 years from now, after taking statins for that time, 
I would be dying one year later than I would have, if I hadn’t taken statins for that period. 
I would have ‘postponed my death’ from 5 years to 6 years by taking statins - if I hadn’t 
avoided dying. But it is very likely I will avoid dying in this period according to your 
chart of the two survival curves. It shows that at the end of the period shown - 6 years - 
my probabilities of survival are 87% without statins and 91% with them. This delay 
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calculation, which after considerable effort I do understand, might mean something if I 
knew I was fairly certain to die 6 years from now. However, I am certainly not certain to 
die in exactly 6 years - or any particular time from now. The difference between the two 
probabilities which generates the 1 year benefit from statins is 4%. But this difference 
has no real use for me either, because 7% and 11% would generate the same 1 year 
‘postponement’ - but affect my decision very differently from 87% and 91%. My 
decision involves trading off any mortality benefit from statins with the absolute 
probabilities for my other benefits and harms, such as morbidity, adverse events, side 
effects, and treatment burdens from statins. In fact, it’s now clear, no one pair of absolute 
probabilities on the survival curves (like 87% and 91% at 6 years) is of any use. What 
has unquestioned personal meaning is my maximum lifetime, so I need to keep in mind 
the full survival curves, not any summary measure and if some restricted time horizon 
has meaning for me, I will decide what it is!” 
How? The best available estimates of the KM survival curves for the individual, for 
each option, are our starting point for decision supporting any RP. Restricted, 
reductionist, relative measures may be introduced, but only subsequently, never initially, 
and never as substitutes in the belief (we believe unwarranted) that they are easier to 
understand and communicate than probability-based measures. Throughout the TTE 
literature it is suggested that summary measures based on a time scale, should replace 
continuous measures based on a probability scale. 
“It is well known that the established effect measures are associated with some 
difficulties when used in clinical care for individual decision-making…Probabilistic 
thinking is difficult. Laymen, patients, and even skilled professionals all suffer from 
various degrees of statistical illiteracy, making it difficult for many to perform simple 
arithmetic calculations and to comprehend risk estimates. This predicament is further 
supported by research showing that the format of the effect measure may influence 
patients’ acceptance of taking a medication as well as doctors’ and health authorities’ 
willingness to recommend or prescribe it. This signifies the challenge clinicians face 
when deciding how to describe treatment outcomes to their patients for the purpose of 
shared decision-making” [7] (p 905). 
We argue the reverse: a time scale measure should be introduced, if at all, only as a 
supplement to the fundamental probabilistic formulation. Neither ease of understanding 
or communication (if true) can justify prioritising a non-probabilistic measure, derived 
from a probabilistic one, on the grounds that it reduces the difficulty of accepting and 
dealing with the inherent uncertainty (correctly) reflected in that underlying one. 
Succumbing to the tempting reductionist relative alternative is a cognitive version of the 
‘streetlight fallacy’, where keys lost in the dark are searched for under the light, because 
it is easier to see there. 
Perhaps surprisingly, many of the most explored issues in relation to How loom 
much less large for us than others. Our purpose in presenting the survival curves is not 
to have them interpreted, even if there is some evidence that they can be well understood 
[13, 14]. Indeed, we positively discourage attempts at interpretation of visual displays of 
all kinds, including emoticon displays that follow best visualization practice in providing 
information on a single criterion. This is because calculation on their basis is essential 
and multi-criterial calculation is not a task to be imposed on an individual engaging with 
a decision support tool, whether highly numerate or not. Implying they are capable of it 
amounts to symbolic violence [15]. Reasonable Person should know what the various 
data elements represent and what procedure (‘algorithm’) is being used to integrate them, 
but not have to attempt synthesizing calculation. The purpose in presenting survival 
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curves is to help the RP understand them only to the extent necessary to understand why 
analytical calculation based on them - in conjunction with equivalent lifetime measures 
for other criteria - is essential. And so to understand why the multi-criteria scores 
resulting from these calculations should be the core output of personalized decision 
support tools. 
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